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In Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya and Tunisia After the Arab Spring , Ibrahim Fraihat examines three
countries grappling with political transition post-revolution, looking at how each has sought to establish a new social
contract amidst the potential revival of unresolved tensions. While Hesham Shafick questions the limitations of the
book’s overarching emphasis on western-centric conflict resolution literature, this is nonetheless a seminal
reference text for students looking at the aftermath of the Arab Spring. 
Unfinished Revolutions: Yemen, Libya and Tunisia After the Arab Spring . Ibrahim Fraihat. Yale University
Press. 2016.
Find this book: 
Literature on revolution typically highlights the double-
edged consequences of overthrowing established
tyrannies. Ibrahim Fraihat’s book, Unfinished Revolutions:
Yemen, Libya and Tunisia After the Arab Spring, begins
with a diagnosis of this phenomenon: ‘The transition
process that follows regime change […] can revive old,
sometimes forgotten, issues.’ As the social contract
terminates, all issues that were resolved, manipulated or
coercively shutdown by the ancien régime are reactivated
as pressing problems on the political stage. National
identity, state structure and modes of economic
production are no longer givens, but rather questions.
Fraihat studies this situation in three recent empirical
cases: Yemen, Libya and Tunisia. In the Yemeni case, the
overthrow of the unification leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh,
brought into question the (dis)unity of the Yemeni nation-
state. In the Libyan case, the termination of the tribal
leaders’ loyalty to the former tyrant, Muammar El-Qazzafi,
incited tribal factionalism, splitting the nation into many
autonomous, self-claimed and self-governing
territorialised factions. As for Tunisia, the relatively smooth
transition of power ensured national coherence, which
makes it qualify as a case of ‘success’ in Fraihat’s terms.
One of the reasons for its temporary ‘success’, however,
is the persistence of the old regime’s institutions (the
army, police, judiciary, etc) despite the revolution against
them, which puts their domestic legitimacy under jeopardy
and makes their persistence more or less a matter of time.
The post-revolution Tunisian state thus is also struggling to reacquire its monopoly over national representation and
the punitive use of force, but so far more ‘peacefully’ and ‘silently’ than Libya and Yemen.
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In all three cases, post-revolution states are attempting, with variant degrees of failure and success, to offer and
enforce a new ‘social contract’ representing the ‘national will’ to replace the overthrown. Accordingly, Fraihat
proposes a threefold prognosis: 1) bringing different factions together to collectively deliberate the ‘national will’; 2)
delineating and prioritising its components and articulating the ‘social contract’ through which it is institutionalised;
and 3) enacting a state structure that represents this national will.
The first point requires a throwback to past grievances that prevent different factions from sitting together on the
negotiation table. The second builds on the first to formulate the contours that represent the collective national
present, while the third is concerned with the institutions that serve the aspired future. Collectively, those steps shall
bring about a national reconciliation, in which past grievances are resolved through transitional justice; the present
social contract is reconstructed to accommodate the widest possible variety of national interests and actors; and the
aspired future is eventually headed towards by means of collective transition, coordinated through a legitimate
nation-state.
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But the devil is in the detail. How can ‘transitional justice’ be achieved that neither disappoints the victims nor
antagonises the punished? How can a reasonable consensus be achieved without excluding outlying actors? And
how can the balance between the variety of actors’ ‘transitional goals’ be determined? There are no universal
answers to such questions. They rather ought to be studied on their own case-specific terms.
Acknowledging the aforementioned case specificity, Fraihat proceeds empirically, interviewing ‘hundreds of national
figures, including senior government officials, heads of political parties and civil society organisations, militia
leaders, tribal leaders, members of displaced communities, scholars, journalists, former regime loyalists and
representatives of a number of international organisations’ in order to frame the contours of the studied conflicts.
As anticipated, the responses he received were far from consensual. However, the variety of raised issues, involved
actors and aspired reforms can still be mapped in around twenty points for each country (see Table 1, 69-70). This
mapping, I believe, is the book’s main contribution. Nonetheless, it still cannot determine how the ‘balance’ between
those different issues, actors and aspirations can be attained.
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The author instead drew on conventional conflict resolution theoretical frameworks to work out priorities and/or
appropriate balances. This was rather disappointing, for one because it contradicted the author’s initial premise of
case specificity. But, more importantly, it also extends the western-centric tradition of conflict resolution literature to
the studied cases. More specifically, Fraihat takes for granted the aspiration for a stable nation-state as a ‘common
denominator’ between the conflicting actors: an assumption that does not pertain to the cases at hand on two main
grounds.
Firstly, it assumes the pre-existence of a homogeneous nation, in which national reconciliation reinstates the ‘normal
condition’ of national unity. This does not apply to the former colonies of the Middle East, which were arbitrarily
divided into non-homogeneous nation-states by exogenous imperialist forces. In addition, both Yemen and Libya of
today were brought into their contemporary existence through the coercive projects of the overthrown tyrants. The
problem of national unity in those cases, thus, is not an offspring of the conflict to be ‘resolved’, but a genuine
sociopolitical question to be addressed on its own historical terms.
Second, it takes for granted the conflicting actors’ aspirations for a legitimate state. This comes from a western-
centric understanding of the state as the optimal form of governance. In the studied cases, it might be the case that
some of the conflicting factions do aspire to one form or another of state rule. But it also might be that those actors
aspire for tribal and/or militaristic political goals that are beyond the domain of the state. The dominance of either of
the two possibilities can only be verified empirically, an endeavour Fraihat’s empirical study overlooks.
Putting the concept of the nation-state at the heart of the proposed reconciliation is therefore problematic. A closer
analysis that takes into consideration the novelty, inevitability and exogeneity of contemporary Middle Eastern
nation-states may suggest that the roots of contemporary conflicts in the region (tribalism, factionalism, illegitimate
states, etc) are more ‘normal’ than they might appear through the lens of western conflict resolution literature. This
would surely have an impact on the proposed ‘way out’ of such conflicts, redefining those conflictual notions as
national ‘questions’ rather than national problems or crises. Whether they are ‘questions’ or ‘problems’ is itself an
empirical inquiry that ought to be studied on its own case-specific terms.
Although the book deftly maps the indigenous actors’ perceptions of the studied post-revolutionary conflicts, its
proposed resolutions were not equally indigenous. Its dependence on western-centric conflict resolution methods
without adjustment to the cases’ peculiar (colonial and postcolonial) histories leads to empirically unverified
(mis)understandings of the involved actors’ aspired transitions. To achieve more indigenous ‘resolutions’, the author
could complement his empirical interrogation of the contemporary conflicts with an equally empirical interrogation of
the actors’ indigenous understanding of those conflicts and their desired resolutions. This can hardly be achieved
without a ‘throwback’ that engages in depth with the history of nationalism and statism in the studied nation-states.
Notwithstanding such limitation, Fraihat’s book remains a seminal empirical reference for students of the Arab
uprisings, as well as a valuable theoretical review on the methods of conflict resolution. Its shortcoming,
nonetheless, pertains to the link it unquestioningly aspires to establish between the two.
Hesham Shafick is a PhD candidate at Queen Mary, University of London (QMUL). Supervised by Kimberly
Hutchings, his dissertation studies the genealogy of political violence against Islamists in Egypt. He previously
studied at University College London, Washington College, University of California in Los Angeles and the American
University in Cairo. He has also taught at the British University in Egypt. Read more by Hesham Shafick.
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London School of Economics.
 
Copyright 2013 LSE Review of Books
3/4
4/4
